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ABSTRACT 
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productivity within a growth accounting framework for 27 Chinese provinces between 1990 and 
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also considered. The results suggest that uneven distribution of resources between the coastal and 
inland provinces increased the regional gap in economic growth throughout the 1990s. 
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  1GROWTH ACCOUNTING FOR THE CHINESE PROVINCES 1990-2000: INCORPORATING 




China’s economy has experienced extraordinary growth since reforms started in 1978. During the 
1990s, GDP per capita in China has grown at a remarkable 8.4 per cent a year (WDI online, World 
Bank). While a large literature exists which explores the sources of economic growth in China, 
results from empirical studies are still the subject of a heated debate. In recent years, increasing 
attention has been paid to the role of education in facilitating China’s economic growth. The 
purpose of this study is to estimate the role of education in facilitating growth in China at the 
provincial level over the course of the 1990s within a neoclassical growth accounting framework.   
 
The contribution of the paper is fourfold. 
 
First, we use a growth accounting framework to consider the contribution of human capital to 
economic growth in China using provincial data. Few growth accounting exercises for China have 
considered the contribution of education to output growth. Wang and Yao (2003) highlight the 
growth role of education by incorporating human capital accumulation as a factor of production. 
Using data at the national level, Wang and Yao (2003) find that the contribution of human capital 
stock accounted for 11 per cent of GDP growth from 1978 to 1999. Wang and Hu (1999) 
incorporate human capital accumulation into a growth accounting framework at the provincial level; 
however, their study is limited because the production elasticities were assumed to be the same for 
all provinces, although the authors admitted that “application of the same set of production 
elasticities to the analysis of economies in different stages of development may not be appropriate” 
(Wang & Hu, 1999: 238).  We address this problem by using provincial factor shares in our growth 
accounting exercise. We find that the labour share varies between the provinces and on average 
was higher in the inland provinces than in the coastal provinces. As the contribution of each factor 
input is sensitive to its output elasticity, a specified factor share for each province is essential for 
utilizing the growth accounting approach using provincial level data. 
 
Second, we construct our measure of human capital stock in terms of average years of schooling 
of the labour force for each province. Some earlier studies have used the enrolment ratio of a 
certain level of schooling as the educational variable. The enrolment ratio, however, as a flow 
variable, might not be the best proxy. As children currently enrolled at school have not yet joined 
the labour force, a time lag coupled with demographic transition makes the link between the 
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the total amount of formal education received by the labour force, is a stock variable. The average 
years of schooling has become the most commonly used specification of the stock of human 
capital in the literature (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995; Barro, 2001; Benhabib and Spiegel, 
1994; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001). This measure, however, has not been widely used in empirical 
studies on China, with the exception of Wang and Yao (2003), who constructed annual national 
data of the average years of schooling of the population aged between 15 and 64 from 1952 to 
1999. Following the methodology employed in Wang and Yao (2003) at the national level, we 
construct average years of formal schooling per capita at the provincial level to measure human 
capital stock for each of the 27 Chinese provinces in 1990 and 2000.  
 
Third, in this paper, our dataset extends up to 2000 to capture the effects of socio-economic 
changes in the second half of the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, China’s economy and society 
underwent substantial reform, including growing educational attainment, readjustment in the 
structure of the labour force and increasing regional income disparities. Existing studies for China 
have used provincial data ending in 1995 (see eg Ezaki and Sun, 1999; Wang and Hu, 1999; Wu, 
2000).  
 
Fourth, we explore the regional characteristics of factor accumulation. Foreshadowing our main 
results, we find that the average contribution of physical capital to GDP growth was higher for the 
coastal provinces than for the inland provinces and the average contribution of human capital to 
output was higher for the inland provinces than for the coastal provinces. This implies that answers 
to the question as to why physical capital investment and human capital stock increased at 
different rates and affected economic growth to different extents among the provinces may lead us 
to identify the determinants of widening regional disparities in China. Therefore, we closely 
examine the nature of regional differences in physical capital and human capital accumulation with 
the view that closer scrutiny of these issues may throw further light on the reasons for regional 
disparities in economic growth. 
 
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. The next section provides a brief review of 
existing studies of the nexus between economic growth and human capital in China. Section 3 sets 
out the growth accounting methodology.  The results from the growth accounting exercise are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 extends the analysis to present results from an augmented 
growth approach. The results are discussed in Section 6 and the conclusions and implications are 
contained in the final section. 
 
  32  EXISTING STUDIES ON THE GROWTH ROLE OF EDUCATION IN CHINA’S ECONOMY 
Not only have very few growth accounting exercises for China specified the contribution of 
education to output growth, but also the majority of these studies have focused on specific sectors 
such as examining productivity performance in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Compared to 
the abundant literature on sectoral productivity, economy-wide studies are rare. In an early article, 
Li (1992) estimates that the growth rate of total output was 9.2 per cent from 1979 to 1994 and the 
growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (TFP), which was negative before the reforms, rose to an 
average 3.8 per cent per year in the post-reform period. Recent studies throw some doubts on 
such high figures. Borensztein and Ostry (1996) argue that productivity growth is substantially 
lower. One reason is that the estimated growth residual may be exaggerated by the absence of 
human capital from the growth-accounting calculations. Using Barro and Lee’s (1996) estimates of 
human capital in China, they employ a simple growth accounting exercise, assuming shares of 0.5, 
0.25, and 0.25 for capital, raw labour, and human capital, respectively. And they find that TFP 
growth declines by an average of 1.0 percentage point per year over the period 1979-1990. In 
other words, part of TFP growth should be attributed to the contribution of human capital. 
 
Focusing on productivity growth in the Chinese provinces during the period 1981-1995, Wu (2000) 
finds that China’s economic growth in the 1980s was attributed to technical efficiency 
improvements and growth in inputs; while in the 1990s technological progress become a more 
important driving force of China’s economic growth. In another study, Wang and Meng (2001) find 
that TFP growth in industry was 1.2 per cent, 2.5 per cent, and 7.3 per cent for the periods 1953-
1977, 1978-1991, and 1992-1997, respectively. Since there was a dramatic increase in foreign 
investment in the 1990s, the authors test whether the technological progress which was brought 
about by foreign investment caused the sudden increase of TFP growth. However, their result 
implies that foreign investment was not the main cause of the extraordinary TFP growth of the 
1990s. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that sources other than the combined effect of 
institutional reform, technological progress and improvement in resource allocation could have 
caused the rapid progress in productivity during the post-reform period. Thus, the authors 
concluded that industrial TFP growth during 1992-1997 appears to represent a statistical error. 
Using deflated GDP data, the authors estimate that TFP growth in the entire economy was 2.3 per 
cent per year during 1978-1991, and about 2.6 per cent per year during 1992-1997. 
  
In recent years, increasing attention has been paid to the role of education in Chinese economic 
growth, mainly in the framework of new growth theories. Using cross-provincial pooled data 
between 1978 and 1989, Chen and Feng (2000) found that an increase in private and semi-private 
enterprises, higher education and international trade resulted in an increase in economic growth in 
China. At the same time, these factors also contributed to uneven growth between the provinces. 
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the Chinese Labour Market Research Project 1992, found that differences in the rates of return to 
human capital between the coast and inland, and among the provinces are statistically 
insignificant. More interestingly, Chen and Fleisher (1996) find a statistically insignificant 
relationship between human capital investment and growth at the provincial level when their 
measure of human capital relates to secondary schooling, but in a later study (Fleisher and Chen, 
1997) when their measure of human capital investment is university-level education, they find a 
positive relationship between human capital and TFP growth. Meanwhile, in a study measuring 
human capital by the gross enrolment rate in senior secondary school at the city level for 1995, 
Jones  et al. (2003) fail to find evidence of a robust correlation between human capital and 
economic growth. While results from the cross-provincial studies are inconclusive, evidence from 
time series data at the national level lends support to the role of education in facilitating growth. In 
a series of empirical studies, Narayan and Smyth (2004a, 2004b, 2005) examine the relationship 
between human capital stock, real investment, exports and real income in China within a 
cointegration and vector error-correction framework. Based on annual data from 1960 to 1999, 
their findings suggest that human capital accumulation has been important in explaining real 
income, real investment and real exports in the long run. Probably, more accurate data at the 
national level, a longer time span and a larger pool of observations are reasons for these more 
favourable results, compared with those from studies at the provincial level. Studies using micro 
data also find increasing private returns to education during the economic reform period (see e.g. 
Liu, 1998; Li, 2003; Zhang et al., 2002).  
 
Within the framework of the traditional neoclassical growth model, most empirical studies have 
paid little attention to specifying the effects of education on growth. However, among the very few 
studies which do, Young (2000) and Wang and Yao (2003) highlight the growth role of education, 
to differing extents. Young (2000) estimates a growth rate of 1.1 percent per annum for human 
capital in the non-agricultural sector during the period 1978 to 1998 in China.  Improvement of 
labour quality may reflect changes in educational attainment or human capital accumulation; 
nonetheless, in Young’s (2000) accounting exercise, education was not specified as a stock 
variable. Wang and Yao’s (2003) study, however, incorporates human capital accumulation as a 
factor of production. Differing in both the definition and measure of human capital growth to Young 
(2000), Wang and Yao (2003) apply the perpetual inventory method to construct current human 
capital stock by adding net graduates at the different levels of schooling to the stocks of the 
previous year. Based on data on annual graduates from the different schooling levels, they obtain 
time series data on the average years of schooling per capita in the working-age population from 
1952 to 1999. In their study, this figure rises from 0.91 years of schooling per capita in 1952 to 5.89 
years of schooling in 1999, with a growth rate of 4.28 per cent per year over the period 1953 to 
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human capital stock accounted for 11 per cent of GDP growth. After incorporating human capital, 
the growth of total factor productivity still contributed 25.4 per cent of economic growth in the 
reform period.  
 
Wang and Hu (1999) conducted a growth accounting study at the provincial level for the period 
1978 to 1995 to examine the economic sources of uneven regional development. They used the 
average years of schooling for the population as a proxy for human capital stock. According to their 
results, “human capital played little role in [explaining] economic growth for all provinces, 
accounting for barely 5 per cent” (Wang and Hu, 1999: 150). This is much smaller than Wang and 
Yao’s (2003) later national estimate for the period 1978-1999. The small human capital effect, 
which Wang and Hu (1999) found, most likely reflects their assumption that all provinces have the 
same set of output elasticities of capital, labour and human capital. As mentioned in the 
introduction, this does not appear to be a reasonable assumption.  
 
DATA AND GROWTH ACCOUNTING METHODOLOGY 
The growth accounting framework essentially decomposes aggregate growth into the relative 
contribution of factor inputs (physical capital and labour) and a residual that captures technological 
progress and other “black box” elements. In conventional growth accounting, the standard 
production function takes the form of: 
) , ( L K AF Y =     (1) 
where Y represents output, A represents the level of technology, K is the stock of capital, and L is 
the labour force. Incorporating the accumulation of human capital as a factor of production, we 
obtain the following aggregate production function: 
β α ) (LH AK Y =          ( 2 )  
where, in addition to the variables defined above, H is the stock of human capital, measured by the 
average years of schooling of the total population. Hence, LH is a skill-adjusted measure of labour 
input, while α and  β  are output elasticities with respect to physical capital and skill-augmented 
labour, where  1 = + β α .   
 
Taking logs and differentiating both sides of Equation (2) yields: 
) ( H L K A Y G G G G G + + + = β α       ( 3 )  
where   is the growth rate of real GDP,   is growth in TFP, and  ,  , and   represent 
the growth rates of K, L and H in Equation (2) respectively. Thus, the growth rate of aggregate 
Y G A G K G L G H G
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capital and skill-augmented labour. The assumption of constant returns to scale, that is  1 = + β α , 
implies that these weights are given by the shares of these inputs in aggregated output.  
 
In constructing the data set for this study, we have used ‘Comprehensive Statistical Data and 
Materials on 50 Years of New China‘, and Hsueh, Li and Liu (1993) for data from 1949-1989 and 
China Statistical Yearbook for data from 1990 to 2000. Chongqing is combined with Sichuan 
province. Since data for Hainan, Tibet and Qinghai are only available spasmodically before 1990 
these provinces are not included. Therefore, we have data for 27 provinces in this study. The rate 
of GDP growth (GY) depends on provincial GDP in real terms. “Indices of GDP” are available at 
the provincial level in Comprehensive Statistical Data and Materials on 50 years of New China (for 
1991-1998), and China Statistical Yearbook (for 1999 and 2000) (1990=100).  
 
Following the approach in Wang and Yao (2003), real capital stock for the aggregate economy is 
estimated using the standard perpetual inventory approach.
* First, to estimate the initial level of 
capital stock in 1990, “fixed assets accumulation” from 1949 to 1989 for each of the 27 provinces 
was used, which is available in the Hsueh, Li and Liu (1993) data set. The value of accumulation of 
fixed assets for a given year is given by “subtracting the depreciation of fixed assets and major 
repairs funds from the value of increase in fixed assets” (Hsueh, Li and Liu, 1993). Thus, summing 
up “fixed assets accumulation” in all years for 1949-1989 for a certain province yields its initial 
capital stock in 1990 (see Hsueh, Li and Liu, 1993, for more details).  
 
The prices of fixed assets did not experience great changes until the economic reform 
implemented in the 1980s. And it has only been since 1991 that China formally started compiling a 
price index for fixed asset investment. Hence, the investment deflator at the provincial level is 
derived from the “price index of investment in fixed assets” available in China Statistical Yearbook 
for the period 1991-2000.  To construct a time series of physical capital stock from investment 
flows, we also need the average rate of depreciation of capital. Here, a depreciation rate of 5 per 
cent as employed in Wang and Yao (2003) is adopted, which was the average rate of depreciation 
for state owned enterprises from 1981-1992. Sensitivity tests, reported in Wang and Yao (2003: 
                                                  
* Specifically, the value of capital stock in a given year equals the value of the capital stock of the previous 
year, plus real investment inflows during that year, less depreciation of the initial capital during that year:  
) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( t I t K t K t I t K t K + − − = − − + − = δ δ  
where t is time, K(t) is the capital stock at time t, I(t) is the real investment inflows at time t, and δ is the 
depreciation rate.  
  737), indicated that the growth rate of real capital stock during the period 1978-1999 was robust to 
different depreciation rates varying between 5 per cent and 15 per cent.  
 
The rate of labour input growth (GL) is estimated from data on population aged between 15 and 64 
at the provincial level, which are available in the fourth national census in 1990 and the fifth 
national census in 2000. Thus, the average annual growth rate of labour input is derived from the 
changes in the economically active population from 1990 to 2000. As a measure of the overall 
growth of the labour force, this data does not contain any information on working hours and 
educational level of workers.  
 
We use a proxy for human capital stock to capture the contribution of changes in the educational 
attainment of the labour force to the quality of labour input. The average years of formal schooling 
per person of the total population in a certain province is introduced as a proxy for human capital 
stock.  First, data for educational attainment of the total population by province are taken from the 
national censuses for the years 1990 and 2000. Next, based on this direct data on attainment 
levels, for each province, average years of schooling (AYS) per capita are calculated as:  
POP H H H H AYS / ) * 14 * 5 . 10 * 8 * 5 ( 4 3 2 1 + + + =      (4) 
Here Hi is the number of persons for whom i is the highest level of schooling attained; i =1, for 
primary school, 2 for junior secondary school, 3 for senior secondary school and secondary 
technical school and 4 for college and above. The number before Hi represents the duration of the 
ith level of schooling (which is adopted from Wang and Yao, 2003). POP is the total population. 
With this formula, we obtain the change of average educational attainment of the total population 
between 1990 and 2000 for all the 27 provinces. The average increase over the decade of the 
1990s was 1.39 years.  
 
In a study of the effect of education on economic growth in Brazil, Lau et al. (1993) argue that their 
finding of a 1.34 year increase in the average education of the labour force in Brazil over the period 
1970-1980 was a very significant achievement. China has the largest population in the world, at 
1,135 million in 1990 and 1,263 million in 2000 (WDI online, World Bank). This figure is ten times 
that of Brazil’s population of 96 million in 1970 and 126 million in 1980 (WDI online, World Bank). 
Meanwhile, China’s GDP per capita accounted for only one ninth of Brazil’s GDP per capita in 
1980, but it increased to half that of Brazil by 2000 (WDI online, World Bank). Considering these 
facts, the 1.39 year increase in average years of schooling per person over the ten years from 
1990-2000 is a substantial achievement for China. Wang and Yao (2003) find a 2.06 per cent 
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annual growth rate of human capital accumulation is 2.6 per cent at the national level during the 
period 1990 to 2000.  
 
We also need estimates of factor shares. Chow (1993) used a value of 0.4 for the labour share 
from 1952-1980. Hu and Khan (1997) used labour shares of 0.386 and 0.453 for the pre-reform 
and reform periods respectively. Li et al (1993) used average labour income shares of 0.462 and 
0.536 for the pre-reform and post-reform periods respectively. Wang and Yao (2003) used a value 
of 0.5 for the overall economy-share of labour over the reform period 1978-1999. Young (2000) 
estimates the share attribution to labour using national income data and obtains a value of 0.6.  
 
Ezaki and Sun (1999) applied data of “payment for labourers” available in China Statistical 
Yearbook for the labour shares. In their study, the 3-year averages of data at the provincial level 
for 1993-1995 were applied to the whole period 1981-1995. Similarly, in this study, the provincial 
distribution share of labour (β ) depends on “payment for labourers/labourers’ remuneration” from 
the China Statistical Yearbook. As defined in the China Statistical Yearbook, 2001 this data “refers 
to the whole payment of various forms earned by the labourers from the productive activities they 
are engaged in, including wages, bonuses and allowances the labourers earned in monetary form 
and in kind. It also includes the free medical services provided to the labourers and the medicine 
expenses, traffic subsidies and social insurance fee paid by the labourers’ working units for them” 
(China Statistical Yearbook, 2001: 85).  At the provincial level, data is only available for 1993 to 
2000. Thus, we applied the seven-year averages for the period 1993-2000 to the whole period 
1990-2000. Adopting this method, the labour share at the national level, which is the average of 
the provincial shares, is 0.54, which is consistent with the estimates in previous studies cited 
above.  
 
RESULTS OF GROWTH ACCOUNTING FOR PROVINCES 
Table 1 presents the results from the growth accounting analysis for the 27 provinces. It also 
includes results obtained for the two aggregate regions (coastal provinces and inland provinces) 
and national averages. Several observations are worth noting. First we look at the national figures. 
As can be seen from Table 1, real GDP grew at 10.64 per cent per annum over the period 1990-
2000. Real capital stock grew at an average annual growth rate of 12.68 per cent. Remaining as 
the most important source of output growth, accumulation of physical capital contributed 55.49 per 
cent of growth throughout the 1990s. Meanwhile, growth of TFP and human capital achieved 
average annual growth rates of 2.45 per cent, and 2.55 per cent, respectively, both exceeding that 
of labour, which maintained a low 1.77 per cent rate. In other words, TFP growth accounted for 22 
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GDP growth was 13 per cent. 
------------------ 
Insert Table 1 
------------------ 
Table 1 shows that there is a considerable disparity in real GDP growth between the coastal and 
inland provinces. The average growth rate of GDP for the period 1990 to 2000 was approximately 
3 percentage points higher for the coastal provinces than the inland provinces. At the provincial 
level, the growth rate in the fastest growing provinces of Fujian and Guangdong were almost twice 
as high as those of the lowest growth rates in Inner Mongolia and Ningxia. While there are two 
provinces in the group of coastal provinces growing at rates lower than the national average, there 
are only 4 of the 16 inland provinces growing faster than the national average.  
 
Besides the disparity in real GDP growth, wider discrepancy in the growth of capital stock 
accumulation is found between the average capital growth rate of the coastal provinces (15.03 per 
cent) and inland provinces (11.06 per cent). Among the coastal provinces, there is only one 
province, Liaoning, whose capital growth rate is lower than the national average. By comparison, 
among the inland provinces, there is only one province, Sichuan, whose capital growth rate is 
above the national average. The average contribution of capital to GDP growth was especially high 
for the coastal provinces (62.5 per cent) compared with the inland provinces (50.67 per cent) over 
the decade of the 1990s. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that each of these 27 provinces 
experienced an extraordinary increase in its capital stock during this period. In all but three 
provinces (Auhui, Jiangxi, and Gansu), capital stock was growing faster than GDP.  In Shanghai, 
the difference between the increases of capital stock and GDP was the largest (more than 5 
percentage points). Overall, Table 1 suggests that those provinces with faster capital accumulation 
also experienced more rapid output growth.  
 
The contribution of labour to GDP growth varies from 3.56 per cent in Anhui to 18.09 per cent in 
Ningxia. On average, a slightly larger percentage of output growth was explained by the growth of 
the labour force among the inland provinces. But it did not exceed 10 per cent. Among all 
provinces, discrepancy in the growth of human capital stock is even smaller than that in labour 
growth. However, the contribution of human capital stock to GDP growth demonstrates regional 
disparities. This figure was 15.79 per cent when averaged among the inland provinces, compared 
with an average of 9.2 per cent for the coastal provinces. As there is not much difference in the 
growth rate of human capital stock between the two regions, the differences in its contribution to 
output growth may be caused by the higher labour share in the inland provinces compared with the 
coastal provinces. Take Guizhou as an example, where the growth rate of human capital was 2.73 
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share across the country (0.6335), the contribution of human capital to GDP growth was the largest 
in Guizhou of the 27 provinces (21 per cent). Shanghai is at the opposite end of the spectrum. With 
the smallest labour share (0.3529) and the lowest growth rate of human capital (1.68 per cent), 
growth of human capital accounted for only 5.2 per cent of output growth, the smallest figure 
among all the provinces. In sum, findings from growth accounting for the provinces over the entire 
period of 1990-2000 indicate that accumulation of human capital contributed substantially to 
economic growth. The finding that 13.4 per cent of output growth could be explained by the growth 
of human capital stock at the national level is consistent with the findings of Wang and Yao’s 
(2003) study that human capital accumulation accounted for 11 per cent of China’s economic 
growth during 1978-1999.  
 
TFP growth was higher for the inland provinces than the coastal provinces. Correspondingly, the 
average  TFP contribution to GDP growth for the inland provinces was higher than that for the 
coastal provinces. However, there was an extraordinarily negative TFP growth rate in Shanghai, 
the only negative figure in all the results. When Shanghai was omitted from the group of coastal 
provinces, the average TFP growth in the group rose to 2.76 per cent annum (from 2.41 per cent) 
and the TFP contribution to GDP growth also increased to 22.23 per cent (from 19.39 per cent). 
Although the inland provinces demonstrated a larger average TFP contribution to output growth, a 
closer look at the individual provinces indicates large disparities within the inland provinces. On the 
one hand, provinces with the largest TFP contribution to GDP growth are found in the group of the 
interior provinces, such as Anhui (38.85 per cent) and Jiangxi (37.23 per cent); on the other hand, 
provinces with the poorest performance are also found in this group, such as Ningxia (4.79 per 
cent) and Heilongjiang (7.48 per cent). In contrast to the more homogeneous coastal provinces, 
wider discrepancies exist in technical progress among the inland provinces.  
 
The finding that Shanghai exhibited a negative TFP growth rate during the 1990s requires some 
further explanation. This result is consistent with the findings of previous studies in the literature. 
Ezaki and Sun (1999) also found that the average rate of TFP growth of Shanghai during the 
period 1981-1995 was negative and a positive rate was recorded only for the years between 1991 
and 1995. In another investigation of productivity growth in China in the 1980s and 1990s, Wu 
(2000) discovered that the three largest cities (Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) had the worst record 
of technological progress and the lowest rates of TFP growth across the country. 
 
In her study, Wu (2000: 286-287) gives some possible explanations for the low TFP growth in the 
largest cities in China. First, these cities have undergone painful changes during the reform period 
due to the dominance of the state sector in their economic structure. Second, the largest cities 
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sectors. Third, less developed cities and provinces have performed better in terms of technical 
catch-up because of the so-called “advantage of backwardness”. These explanations are insightful 
in understanding the Shanghai case. Among the three largest cities, Shanghai has the heaviest 
“dominant state sector” in its economic structure. Hence, there are serious problems arising from a 
large number of laid-off workers, reforms to state-owned enterprises and restructuring of sunset 
industries. Furthermore, as some scholars in China have pointed out, directed by a strategy to 
develop the tertiary industry or service sector in the early 1990s, Shanghai slowed down its 
investment and technological innovation in manufacturing industries and replaced it by huge 
investment in financial and trade infrastructure. It is also argued that Shanghai’s declining 
productivity in manufacturing is evidence of inefficiency of its manufacturing factories (Zhang, 
2003). Hence, it is argued that the growth of the Shanghai economy depends heavily on capital 
accumulation. 
 
The regional disparity between provinces is one of the crucial issues facing the Chinese economy. 
From an aggregate perspective, the growth accounting analysis reveals the gap in economic 
capacity between provinces, emphasizing the regional characteristics of factor accumulation. 
Another important indicator of regional disparity is the gap in income between provinces.  Table 2 
presents real GDP per capita for each province at constant 1990 prices for 1990 and 2000 in both 
absolute and relative terms, as well as changes from 1990 to 2000. As shown in the table, the gap 
between provinces in the coastal area and those in inland China has widened in relative terms to 
the national average (China=1). In 2000, there was only one province, Guangxi, in the group of 
coastal provinces, whose GDP per capita (2986 RMB) was much lower than the national average 
(4843 RMB). By comparison, there was no inland province whose GDP per capita reached the 
national average. Overall, the average GDP per capita in the group of coastal provinces was 2.4 
times that in the group of interior provinces. In 2000 GDP per capita in Shanghai, the richest 
province, was eight times that of Guizhou, the poorest province. All provinces in the coastal area 
improved their positions relative to Guizhou, although not all of their positions relative to the 
national average changed much over the period 1990-2000. Examining the position of each 
province, especially the rich provinces, relative to the poorest province (Guizhou), reveals 
increasing polarization in income levels between the provinces over the course of the 1990s.  
-------------- 
Insert Table 2 
------------- 
As shown in Table 2, figures for the inland provinces are mixed. In absolute values, GDP per 
capita for the inland provinces increased remarkably in the 1990s. However, measured in relative 
levels to the national average (China=1), 11 out of the 16 inland provinces experienced negative 
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in 2000 (in real terms), but in both years, it was 65 per cent of the average per capita GDP of the 
country. This means that only four interior provinces were slightly better-off in comparison to the 
national average over the period 1990-2000. These four provinces - Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, and 
Hubei - are the four inland provinces whose growth rates of real GDP were higher than the national 
average in the above analysis. Nevertheless, in relative terms compared to Guizhou (Guizhou=1), 
the average GDP per capita of the inland provinces was better-off during the years between 1990 
and 2000. Comparing the magnitudes of relative increases in income between the coastal and 
inland provinces, though, both in terms of relative levels to the national average and in relative 
levels to Guizhou, the coastal provinces demonstrated greater changes over the period.  
 
FURTHER EXPLORATION: RESULTS FROM AN AUGMENTED GROWTH APPROACH  
From Table 1 we can see human capital stock in terms of average years of schooling per capita is 
important in explaining provincial economic growth. The problem is that the significant role played 
by human capital stock may be assigned in advance through the allocation of factor shares. 
Therefore, in this section, an alternative regression approach is used to dispense with the 
assumption that the factor social marginal products coincide with the observable factor prices. This 
alternative regression approach is an alternative growth accounting approach, which is different 
from the “non-econometric” standard growth accounting approach. Barro (1998: 6) pointed out that 
“the main advantage of the regression approach is that it dispenses with the assumption that the 
factor social marginal products coincide with the observable factor prices”. Nonetheless, “the 
usually preferred approach to TFP estimation is the non-econometric one”. 
 
In this section, a regression analysis based on cross sectional data for 27 Chinese provinces in 
1990 and 2000 is applied in an attempt to test the assumption of constant returns to scale, and to 
explain the reasons for the difference in the TFP level between provinces. In the usual form of a 
regression framework, the growth rate of output, GY, is regressed on the growth rates of inputs, Gk 
and GL. In this study, the standard form is extended to allow for variations in factor shares and TFP 
growth. Equation (5) presents the regression framework where growth of real GDP (Y) is explained 
by growth of real investment (IV) and population by education level, degree of government 
expenditure (GOV= government consumption expenditure/GDP) and trade (TI = [imports + 
exports]/GDP), and a region-specific dummy variable for the coastal provinces (DC)
†. Note total 
population is decomposed into five groups with different levels of schooling. 
                                                  
† For an alternative regression analysis to explain differences of TFP growth, TFP can be regressed on 
explanatory variables such as GOV, TI and DC used in this study (see eg. Smyth & Lu, 2003). However, as 
the regression approach is intended to be used to estimate growth effects of capital and labour inputs and 
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1 0 ln ln    (5) 
where   is population for whom  Lj j is the highest level of schooling attained; j =1, for no schooling 
(or less than primary schooling), 2 for primary schooling, 3 for junior secondary schooling, 4 for 
senior secondary and secondary technical schooling and 5 for college education and above. This 
disaggregation of population allows the education factor to enter the production function. If different 
education levels have an effect on growth, we should find that the estimated coefficients  j β  should 
vary with j.  
 
Ezaki and Sun (1999) run a similar regression as an extension of conventional growth accounting 
for the Chinese provinces for 1981-1995 in order to explain the growth of TFP. Their specification 
includes explanatory variables other than the production factors (labour and capital inputs), i.e. the 
degree of marketization (the ratio of investment of non-state enterprise to total investment), the 
degree of openness (the ratio of foreign direct investment to total investment and the ratio of total 
exports and imports to GDP), and dummy variables for the provinces in the middle region and 
western region, respectively. Their results indicate that non-state enterprises, foreign direct 
investment and the regional dummy variables are important common factors explaining TFP 
growth in each province. In this study, in addition to the production factors, we include government 
expenditure, trade and a regional dummy variable for the coastal provinces in our specification. We 
hypothesise that government expenditure has a negative effect on growth. Government 
consumption expenditure represents government intervention which reduces economic efficiency. 
Hence the correlation with government expenditure and growth should be negative. Trade is 
hypothesised to have a positive effect on growth. East Asia’s historical experience suggests that 
an export-oriented development strategy can drive economic growth in a developing country by 
raising its productivity, improving efficiency and increasing its technical progress. Economic growth 
is hypothesised to be higher in the coastal provinces, reflecting the impact of geographic location 
on provincial economic performance. 
 
Before we move to the empirical analysis, we test the hypotheses of constant returns to scale and 
that the output elasticities of the population with different education levels  j β  are the same: 
5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β = = = = . The results are presented in Table 3. According to the results, the 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected, but the hypothesis that the output 
                                                                                                                                                               
also to test the constant return to scale assumption, here we just extend the standard form regression to 
include the extra explanatory variables, with growth of real GDP being the dependent variable.  
 
  14elasticities of the population with different education levels are the same is rejected at the 5 
percent level of significance. This result implies that the effect of differences in the education of the 
populace on growth varies. 
--------------------- 
Insert Tables 3 & 4 
--------------------- 
The results of estimation from Equation (5) are reported in Table 4. The relative magnitudes of the 
estimated parameters of the population with a certain education are consistent with the existence 
of an effect of education. The findings display an education effect, where the estimated effect of 
population without an education or with less than primary education (L1) is negative while that of 
the population with a primary school education is 27 per cent and statistically significant at 5 
percent. The estimated effects of the other three levels of education are not statistically significant.  
 
Using nonparametric estimation techniques and panel data from the Barro and Lee (1996) data 
base, Kalaitzidakis et al. (2001) found evidence of a nonlinear effect of human capital on economic 
growth. Their findings are consistent with the theoretical suggestion that there exist threshold 
levels of human capital. In another study, Lau et al. (1993) also found a threshold effect for human 
capital in Brazil during the 1970s. While we did not find such an effect in this study, the positive 
sign on the coefficient of population with secondary education and the negative sign on the 
coefficient of population with higher education suggest this issue merits further research.  
 
The results in Table 4 suggest that government expenditure had a negative effect on GDP growth, 
consistent with results from existing studies on regional disparities in China (see e.g. Cai et al., 
2002). Trade, measured by total exports and imports as a proportion of GDP, displayed a small but 
still positive effect on growth at the 15 percent level of significance. This is consistent with the 
existing literature on China’s economic growth (see e.g. Chen and Feng, 2000; Ezaki and Sun, 
1999; Kanbur and Zhang, 2003). The coefficient on the dummy variable for the coastal provinces 
was also positive and statistically significant, which was consistent with prior expectations. 
 
DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The findings on regional disparities are consistent with the results of several extant studies. In 
terms of real per capita GDP, per capita consumption or expenditure, or gross value of industrial 
and agricultural outputs of the Chinese provinces, most studies have found that disparities 
between the coast and inland have increased sharply in the 1990s (see e.g. Bao et al., 2002; Jian, 
et al., 1996; Kanbur and Zhang, 1999; Lee 2000; Song et al., 2000; Yang, 2002; Ying, 1999). The 
findings in the proceeding section have confirmed the large gap in GDP growth and the widening 
gap in GDP per capita between the coastal and inland provinces over the 1990s. A question 
  15arises, therefore, about the causes of the uneven growth of the provinces. This issue is examined 
by focusing on differences in capital investment and human capital stock across provinces.  
 
The results from the growth accounting exercise indicated that physical capital accumulation 
contributed more than 50 per cent of China’s economic growth over the 1990s. Faster growth of 
the coastal provinces is attributable to faster accumulation of factors in these areas. The 
differences between the coastal provinces and inland provinces were much larger in the growth 
rate of capital stock than in the growth rates of labour, human capital stock and technical progress 
over the period. This poses a question as to why capital stock increased at a faster rate in some 
provinces than others. An answer to this question will help to explain the causes of widening 
regional disparities. The first step to the answer is to distinguish between different sources of 
capital investment. Subsequent to doing this, we examine the differences between provinces in 
relation to these different sources of capital investment.  
 
Capital investment can be financed from three sources: local capital, inter-provincial capital 
movements, and foreign capital. Early studies show that interregional capital flows dissipated 
substantially during the course of reform, especially after the mid-1980s when all provinces had 
become financially more independent, as a result of decentralization (e.g. Wang and Hu, 1999; 
Renard, 2002). Hence, domestic investment in most provinces was predominantly financed by 
local savings (Kraay, 2000; Wang and Hu, 1999: 154; Wang and Yao, 2003). As Wang and Yao 
(2003: 44) put it, “a high and rising saving rate is one of the most striking features of the Chinese 
economy during transition.” Wang and Hu (1999) also find a strong correlation between the 
savings rate (savings/GDP) and GDP per capita for the provinces during the period 1978-1995. 
They argued that the rich provinces had relatively more ability to achieve higher capital investment 
through higher levels of local savings than the poor provinces. This is in line with our findings. The 
positive correlations between the growth rate of GDP and capital stock and between GDP per 
capita and capital stock are evident in Table 1 and Table 2. The coastal provinces with faster 
economic growth had higher GDP per capita and exhibited more rapid accumulation of capital.  
 
Foreign investment is another important source of increasing capital stock. Since 1991, China has 
become the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) among all developing countries 
(Wang and Hu, 1999: 156). A large literature exists which addresses the key role of FDI in driving 
the rapid growth of China in the 1990s (e.g., Berthelemy and Demurger, 2000; Bao et al., 2002; 
Chen and Feng, 2000; Fleisher and Chen, 1997; Jones et al., 2003). But the spatial distribution of 
foreign capital across China has been highly uneven, reflecting geographic factors and preferential 
policies.  
 
  16Since the market reforms started in 1978, the central government’s regional development 
strategies have favoured the coastal provinces. The key component of this reform, the Open-Door 
Policy, was launched, opening up certain areas along the coast to attract FDI and promote foreign 
trade in the early 1980s. Since 1980, five special economic zones (SEZs) have been established. 
In 1984, the state further opened 14 coastal cities to overseas investment. Shortly afterwards, the 
central government expanded the open coastal areas, extending into an open coastal belt. 
 
All the open areas acquired considerable economic autonomy, including the authority to approve 
large-scale investment projects, the freedom to grant tax concessions to foreign investors, and the 
right to retain a higher proportion of earned foreign exchange (Wang and Hu, 1999: 178). In 
addition, they also enjoyed preferred tax treatments and received preferential resource allocations 
(Litwack and Qian, 1998). In addition, different open areas were also permitted to adopt different 
preferential policies depending on their local economic characteristics. Beside free trade zones, 
preferential policies in terms of reducing or eliminating customs duties and income tax are common 
in economic and technological development zones and certain SEZs. The Shanghai Pudong New 
Zone has enjoyed special preferential policies which are not yet extended to the other open areas. 
For instance, in addition to tax reduction policies, the central government also permits the Pudong 
New Zone to allow foreign businesses to open financial institutions and run tertiary industries. The 
state has given Shanghai permission to set up a stock exchange, expand its examination and 
approval authority over investments and allow foreign-funded banks to engage in RMB business. 
As a consequence, since 1992, the Shanghai Pudong New Zone has made great progress in both 
absorbing foreign capital and accelerating the economic development of the Yangtze River valley.  
 
A number of studies have emphasized the important role of preferential policies in causing regional 
inequality in China (see e.g., Demurger et al. 2002; Jacobs, 1997; Jones et al., 2003; Wang and 
Hu, 1999; Yang, 2002). Giving each province a weight that reflects the type of economic zone that 
it hosts, Demurger et al. (2002) constructed a policy index for each of the 30 provinces from 1978 
to 1998. Their findings show that the index was highest for the coastal cities with provincial status 
(Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin) and lowest for the central and north western provinces. 
 
The geographic advantage of the coastal provinces that enabled them to achieve higher capital 
returns has been emphasized by many studies (see e.g., Bao et al., 2002; Batisse, 2002; Brun et 
al., 2002; Demurger et al., 2002; Yang, 2002). China has a large landscape, stretching from 
temperate to subtropical zones. As mountains and plateaus account for 59 per cent of the total 
land (China Statistical Yearbook 2003: 6), there are topographic constraints on economic 
development. The physical location of the coastal provinces gives them another advantage in 
attracting FDI and foreign trade. As Demurger et al. (2002: 449) put it, “the low cost of water 
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better suited to be platforms for producing manufactured exports.” Bao et al. (2002) found that 
coastline length was the most important factor, while the effects of distance and elevation were 
relatively weak factors in explaining ability of provinces to attract capital flows.  
 
By incorporating human capital accumulation into growth accounting, we found that human capital 
stock does play a significant role in economic growth for all provinces, especially the inland 
provinces. To find the regional characteristics that affect human capital accumulation, we start 
through taking a closer look at changes in human capital stock at the provincial level in the 1990s. 
Table 5 provides the average number of years of formal schooling per person by province in 1990 
and 2000. It shows that all provinces achieved higher educational attainment in 2000. In absolute 
terms, human capital stock increased remarkably over the decade. Unlike the large discrepancy in 
physical capital accumulation, provinces appeared to perform more equally in human capital 
accumulation. Overall, in 2000 the average years of schooling for the inland provinces were 5.95 
years and that of the coastal provinces were 6.76 years.  
----------- 
Insert Table 5 
---------------- 
However, some results in Table 5 are less encouraging. The average educational attainment of the 
inland provinces was lower than that of the national average in both 1990 and 2000. Guizhou, the 
poorest province in terms of GDP per capita, had the lowest level of educational attainment in 
2000, merely 4.68 schooling years per capita. Besides Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, and Ningxia have 
the next poorest performance in their average years of schooling, with 4.91 years, 5.17 years, and 
5.48 years, respectively. Each of these provinces are poor interior provinces.  A study of disparities 
in basic education among counties in China between 1994 and 1997 showed that there was 
widening educational inequality between urban and rural counties and that poor counties were 
significantly disadvantaged in terms of per student recurrent expenditure, teacher quality, and 
physical conditions of schools (World Bank, 1999). On the one hand, decentralization has 
diversified education funding and provided increased autonomy and flexibility in school-level 
management by increasing mobilization of local resources. On the other, devolution has also 
brought serious problems of inequity both within and across provinces. Provinces which have 
experienced rapid economic growth have benefited from more financial resources. Variation in 
local resources has translated into disparities in capital construction and teacher salaries and in the 
quantity and quality of teaching facilities and materials.  
--------------- 
Insert Table 6 
-------------- 
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attainment. Table 6 shows educational expenditure of the provinces through using two indicators to 
reveal the contribution of two sources of educational investment: NGE measures the share of non-
government funds in total educational expenditure; while GE captures the ratio of expenditure on 
education in total government expenditure. It is shown in Table 6 that the average share of 
educational funds from non-government sources in total educational funds was 5 per cent higher in 
the coastal provinces than in the inland provinces in 2000. By comparison, the differences in the 
average share of government expenditure on education (measured by GE) between the inland and 
coastal governments were much smaller, with 16.49 per cent for the coastal provinces and 15.01 
per cent for the inland provinces. These findings confirm that it was the provinces with the fastest 
economic growth which benefited from more financial resources, especially non-government 
resources.  
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Over the first two decades of market reform, substantial educational and economic disparities 
emerged in China. This study has attempted to address two questions: 1) what have been the 
effects of physical capital and human capital accumulation on economic growth of the 27 Chinese 
provinces between 1990 and 2000; 2) to what extent do regional disparities in factor accumulation 
affect economic growth. 
 
By incorporating human capital stock as a factor of production, the linkage between aggregate real 
output and capital, labour, education, and productivity has been examined within a framework of 
growth accounting. The main findings are: first, economic growth in China’s provinces depends 
heavily on the accumulation of physical capital stock, which accounted for around 55 per cent of 
GDP growth at the national level. Second, human capital stock plays an important role in 
facilitating growth in all the provinces, contributing to 13 per cent of output growth on average 
between 1990 and 2000. Third, the regional income disparities between the coast and inland 
provinces are substantial. As far as GDP per capita, the average years of schooling per capita and 
the growth rates of output and capital stock, our findings suggest that the coastal provinces are 
relatively prosperous and that the inland provinces lag behind.  
 
The empirical analysis suggests that uneven distribution of resources between the coastal and 
inland provinces increased the regional gap in growth. Preferential policies and geographic 
characteristics have enabled the coastal provinces to increase capital stock at a faster rate. The 
rapid economic growth benefited the coastal provinces with more financial resources. As a 
consequence, these provinces have achieved higher educational attainment. When the market 
reforms were launched, it was believed by the policymakers that if certain regions were allowed to 
  19prosper first, their affluence would eventually trickle down to other regions (Wang and Hu, 1999: 
177-179). However, recent empirical studies suggest that spillover effects have been insufficient to 
reduce regional income inequality, especially in western China (see Brun et al. 2002).  
 
The challenge to policymakers is to address the disparities mainly arising from inequalities in the 
educational finance system. Here, the central government may take a more active role in balancing 
the present uneven distribution of educational investment across the country. On the one hand, the 
central government should increase intergovernmental transfers to provide more educational 
grants to help equalize the access of education for children in poor areas. On the other hand, the 
central government should guide and monitor investment in education from other non-government 
resources, via setting standards for private schools, paving the way for social donations to 
education and cooperating with international organizations.  
 
Within the neoclassical framework, this study has attempted to assess the linkage between human 
capital stock and output growth.  Future research could examine the role of the labour market in 
this process. Are there sufficient wage differentials to encourage individuals to acquire more 
schooling? Will greater freedom for individuals to change jobs have a positive effect on growth? 
Will migration between the provinces reduce the regional gap in educational attainment or increase 
it? What factors are essential in transferring a successful education system to successful economic 
development? Further study is needed on these topics to find the mechanism through which an 
effective labour market enables education to fuel economic growth. 
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Table 1: Growth accounting for national, regional and provincial economies of China: 1990-2000 
Averaged for the period 1990 - 2000 
  Growth rate (%)  Contribution (%) 
 Y  K  L  H  TFP 
Labour 
Share K  L  H TFP 
National  10.64   12.68   1.77   2.55   2.45  0.5369   55.49   8.96   13.40   22.15  
Coast  12.24   15.03   2.05   2.42   2.41   0.4942   62.50   8.18  9.92   19.39  
Inland  9.54   11.06   1.58   2.64   2.38   0.5662   50.67   9.50   15.79   24.04  
                
COAST                
Beijing  10.39   12.82   3.04   2.00   1.33  0.4836   63.71   14.17   9.31   12.82  
Tianjin  10.99   12.92   1.87   1.93   2.49  0.4852   60.54   8.24   8.54   22.68  
Hebei  12.20   14.94   1.40   2.90   2.91  0.5310   57.44   6.09   12.60   23.87  
Liaoning  8.65   10.86   1.18   1.79   1.55  0.4763   65.75   6.50   9.84   17.91  
Shanghai  11.41   16.78   2.79   1.68   -1.03  0.3529   95.17   8.64   5.20   -9.00  
Jiangsu  13.32   16.50   1.34   2.64   3.04  0.4966   62.34   4.99   9.84   22.83  
Zhejiang  14.03   16.74   1.66   2.39   3.27  0.4709   63.11   5.56   8.03   23.30  
Fujian  14.81   17.78   2.49   3.30   3.22  0.5158   58.15   8.66   11.49   21.71  
Shandong  13.09   13.72   1.30   2.73   3.8  0.4575   56.86   4.54   9.54   29.07  
Guangdong  14.50   17.51   4.03   2.55   2.51  0.5053   59.73   14.04   8.90   17.33  
Guangxi  11.21   14.79   1.46   2.69   3.45  0.6608   44.74   8.59   15.88   30.79    26
  Growth rate (%)  Contribution (%) 
  Y K L H  TFP 
Labour 
Share  K L H  TFP 
INLAND                
Shanxi  9.01   9.56   1.60   1.98   2.5  0.5106   51.93   9.04   11.24   27.78  
Inner Mongolia  7.87   11.60   1.85   2.40   0.66  0.5971   59.38   14.00   18.20   8.41  
Jilin  9.77   11.91   1.82   2.12   2.64  0.6003   48.72   11.19   13.03   27.06  
Helongjiang  8.17   10.98   1.30   2.10   0.61  0.4515   73.74   7.18   11.60   7.48  
Anhui  11.53   10.45   0.76   3.43   4.48  0.5422   41.48   3.56   16.11   38.85  
Jiangxi  11.12   10.87   1.66   3.04   4.14  0.6302   36.15   9.42   17.20   37.23  
Henan  10.90   12.30   1.13   2.79   3.75  0.6141   43.54   6.34   15.70   34.41  
Hubei  11.26   13.40   1.80   2.86   2.85  0.5717   50.99   9.16   14.54   25.32  
Hunan  9.92   11.87   1.20   2.57   3.11  0.6250   44.88   7.55   16.18   31.39  
Sichuan  9.86   13.66   0.47   1.96   2.63  0.5723   59.24   2.72   11.38   26.66  
Guizhou  8.26   9.39   1.04   2.73   2.43  0.6335   41.68   7.95   20.91   29.47  
Yunnan  9.25   10.52   2.17   3.26   1.07  0.4589   61.51   10.78   16.18   11.52  
Shannxi  8.56   8.97   1.38   2.82   2.41  0.5907   42.88   9.51   19.45   28.16  
Gansu  9.10   8.45   1.36   3.13   2.77  0.5346   43.23   7.99   18.36   30.41  
Ningxia  8.14   11.09   2.55   2.76   0.39  0.5776   57.54   18.09   19.58   4.79  
Xinjiang  9.95   11.89   3.17   2.33   1.57  0.5491   53.87   17.50   12.88   15.76  
Notes  
Y: real GDP; K: real capital stock;L: Labour force, population aged 15-64; H: Average years of schooling per capita.   27
Table 2. GDP per capita (at constant 1990 prices) by province: 1990-2000 
  1990  2000  2000 minus 1990 
   GDP p.c.  China=1  Guizhou=1  GDP p.c.  China=1  Guizhou=1  China=1  Guizhou=1
National 1886   1.00   2.37  4843   1.00   2.86  0.00  0.49 
Coast  2681   1.42   3.37   7417   1.53   4.38   0.11   1.01  
Inland  1340   0.71   1.68   3072   0.63   1.81   -0.08   0.13  
            
COAST             
Beijing  4538   2.41   5.70   10180   2.10   6.01   -0.31   0.31  
Tianjin  3590   1.90   4.51   9243   1.91   5.46   0.01   0.95  
Hebei  1455   0.77   1.83   4436   0.92   2.62   0.15   0.79  
Liaoning  2713   1.44   3.41   6159   1.27   3.64   -0.17   0.23  
Shanghai  5894   3.12   7.40   14253   2.94   8.42   -0.18   1.02  
Jiangsu  2093   1.11   2.63   7087   1.46   4.19   0.35   1.56  
Zhejiang  2120   1.12   2.66   7740   1.60   4.57   0.48   1.91  
Fujian  1741   0.92   2.19   6329   1.31   3.74   0.39   1.55  
Shandong  1794   0.95   2.25   6072   1.25   3.59   0.30   1.33  
Guangdong  2496   1.32   3.14   7103   1.47   4.20   0.15   1.06  
Guangxi  1059   0.56   1.33   2986   0.62   1.76   0.06   0.43  
  1990  2000  2000 minus 1990 
   GDP p.c.  China=1 Guizhou=1 GDP p.c.  China=1  Guizhou=1 China=1  Guizhou=1  28
INLAND             
Shanxi  1481   0.79   1.86   3189   0.66   1.88   -0.13   0.02  
Inner Mongolia  1476   0.78   1.85   2954   0.61   1.74   -0.17   -0.11  
Jilin  1743   0.92   2.19   4185   0.86   2.47   -0.06   0.28  
Helongjiang  2019   1.07   2.54   4345   0.90   2.57   -0.17   0.03  
Anhui  1162   0.62   1.46   3479   0.72   2.05   0.10   0.59  
Jiangxi  1125   0.60   1.41   3140   0.65   1.85   0.05   0.44  
Henan  1081   0.57   1.36   2999   0.62   1.77   0.05   0.41  
Hubei  1516   0.80   1.90   4192   0.87   2.48   0.07   0.57  
Hunan  1218   0.65   1.53   3136   0.65   1.85   0.00   0.32  
Sichuan  1129   0.60   1.42   2047   0.42   1.21   -0.18   -0.21  
Guizhou  796   0.42   1.00   1693   0.35   1.00   -0.07   0.00  
Yunnan  1212   0.64   1.52   2561   0.53   1.51   -0.11   -0.01  
Shannxi  1219   0.65   1.53   2673   0.55   1.58   -0.10   0.05  
Gansu  1077   0.57   1.35   2335   0.48   1.38   -0.09   0.03  
Ningxia  1392   0.74   1.75   2625   0.54   1.55   -0.20   -0.20  
Xinjiang  1792   0.95   2.25   3606   0.74   2.13   -0.21   -0.12  
 Table 3: Tests of hypotheses of constant returns to scale and that the output elasticities of 
the population with different education levels are the same 
 
Hypotheses  F-statistic Probability 
1 5 4 3 2 1 1 = + + + + + β β β β β α   0.004685 0.945742 
5 4 3 2 1 β β β β β = = = =   3.438750 0.015709 
 
  29Table 4: Regression analysis across provinces 1990 and 2000 
Explanatory variables Coefficient  t-Statistic 
lnIV 0.632800*  11.35928 
lnL1 -0.179477*  -2.418429 
lnL2 0.268717**  2.117974 
lnL3 0.268416  1.286988 
lnL4 0.040432  0.242089 
lnL5 -0.035679  -0.244208 
GOV -1.210907**  -2.041019 
TI 6.46E-05***  1.560036 
DC 0.099646*  2.665699 
C 0.834100*  2.674819 
R-squared           0.977356 
 
Notes: *denotes variable is statistically significant at 0.01 level; ** denotes variable is statistically significant 




  30Table 5. Average years of schooling per capita by provinces: 1990-2000 
   H (=AYS) 
 1990  2000  2000-1990 
National  4.89 6.28  1.39 
Coast 5.33  6.76  1.42 
Inland 4.58  5.95  1.37 
COAST      
Beijing   6.87  8.39  1.52 
Tianjin   6.16  7.47  1.31 
Hebei   4.73  6.32  1.59 
Liaoning   5.81  6.95  1.14 
Shanghai   6.63  7.84  1.21 
Jiangsu   4.97  6.47  1.50 
Zhejiang   4.78  6.07  1.29 
Fujian   4.42  6.14  1.72 
Shandong   4.71  6.19  1.48 
Guangdong   4.99  6.44  1.45 
Guangxi 4.61  6.03  1.42 
INLAND      
Shanxi   5.24  6.4  1.16 
Inner Mongolia  4.97  6.32  1.35 
Jilin   5.51  6.81  1.30 
Helongjiang 5.51  6.8  1.29 
Anhui   3.98  5.61  1.63 
Jiangxi   4.42  5.99  1.57 
Henan   4.72  6.24  1.52 
Hubei   4.79  6.38  1.59 
Hunan   4.91  6.35  1.44 
Sichuan   4.71  5.73  1.02 
Guizhou   3.56  4.68  1.12 
Yunnan   3.54  4.91  1.37 
Shannxi 4.71  6.25  1.54 
Gansu   3.78  5.17  1.39 
Ningxia 4.16  5.48  1.32 
Xinjiang 4.82  6.09  1.27 
 
  31Table 6: Education expenditure by province in 2000 
COAST NGE GE  INLAND NGE GE 
Average 32.30  16.49  Average  27.23  15.01 
Beijing   30.02  13.56  Shanxi   28.78  16.96 
Tianjin   34.79  16.50  Inner Mongolia   20.29  12.03 
Hebei   29.17  17.72  Jilin   26.72  13.74 
Liaoning   26.09  12.72  Helongjiang  24.47  12.83 
Shanghai   30.56  13.82  Anhui   31.99  16.69 
Jiangsu   35.15  19.86  Jiangxi   33.23  17.07 
Zhejiang   39.18  18.13  Henan   32.18  17.36 
Fujian   29.43  19.11  Hubei   43.20  15.64 
Shandong   28.96  19.26  Hunan   42.70  14.63 
Guangdong   40.59  13.40  Sichuan   32.65  13.95 
Guangxi 31.39  17.30  Guizhou    19.67  15.77 
     Yunnan    16.15  15.05 
     Shannxi  28.93  14.15 
     Gansu    19.21  14.63 
     Ningxia  20.27  13.29 
     Xinjiang  15.23  16.42 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2001 
Notes: 
NGE = (Non-governmental educational funds)/(Total educational funds) 
GE = (Educational expenditure)/(Total government expenditure) 
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